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Avian influenza viruses
Influenza viruses belong to the Orthomyxoviridae fam-
ily, genus Orthomyxovirus, and are divided into three 
types – A, B, and C – based on the antigenic differences 
between their nucleoprotein and matrix proteins. Influ-
enza A viruses are further subdivided into several sub-
types. A most striking feature of influenza viruses is their 
ability to continually change their genetic structure – in 
particular, hemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N) – 
so as to reach the antigenic heterogeneity that allows 
them to infect several animal species [1]. According to 
the current nomenclature, influenza A viruses are clas-
sified on the basis of the characteristics of their surface 
antigens hemagglutinin and neuraminidase [1]. Sixteen 
hemagglutinin subtypes (H1-H16) and nine neuramini-
dase subtypes (N1-N9) have been identified so far [2]. 
The hemagglutinin and neuraminidase subtypes seem to 
be able to assort into any combination, and most of the 
144 possible combinations have been found in natural 
reservoir species [3].
The natural host reservoir species of influenza A viruses 
is the avifauna, particularly waterfowl that can harbour 
all subtypes of influenza A viruses identified so far. Be-
sides birds, influenza A viruses can also infect a wide 
range of mammals such as pigs, horses, dolphins, seals, 
whales, and humans [1, 3]. Phylogenetic studies have re-
vealed that the gene sequences of different species-spe-
cific lineages originated from those belonging to viruses 
isolated from aquatic birds. This indicates that birds are 
the natural reservoir of all influenza A virus subtypes 
spread in the animal kingdom [4-6].
Influenza A viruses are usually not pathogenic for wild 
aquatic birds, revealing that they have obtained an op-
timal level of adaptation in these natural reservoirs. 
In these hosts, the annual peak of influenza infections 
coincides with the migratory period (late summer and 
early winter for the Northern hemisphere) [6, 7]. Avian 
influenza viruses (AIV) show a tropism for cells of the 
intestinal tract, therefore indicating that the main trans-
mission route is via faecal-oral. The direct or indirect 
contact between migratory species and breeding species 
is often the cause of the occurrence of epizootic [8, 9]. 
Most AIVs cause asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic 
infections in birds, but symptoms can vary depending on 
both virus strains and type of poultry [8, 9].
AIVs are classified according to their potential patho-
genicity in: a) highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 
viruses, which cause systemic infections in domestic 
birds with rapid progression and death rates as high as 
100%, and b) low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) 
viruses, usually responsible for outbreaks of moder-
ate severity in poultry [10, 11]. Phylogenetic studies 
have revealed the existence of two geographically dis-
tinct sub-lineages (Eurasian and American, respective-
ly), probably related to different patterns of migratory 
birds [6, 12]. Both HPAI and LPAI viruses belong to 
these two sub-lineages, indicating that the viral patho-
genicity is not associated with a particular geographical 
distribution. All HPAI strains identified to date belong 
to H5 and H7 subtypes, and are mainly responsible for 
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Summary
The A(H5N1) influenza remains a disease of birds with a signifi-
cant species barrier: in the presence of some tens million cases of 
infection in poultry - with a wide geographical spread -, only a few 
hundreds cases have occurred in humans. To date, human cases 
have been reported in 15 countries - mainly in Asia - and all were 
related to the onset of outbreaks in poultry. A peak of H5N1 human 
cases was recorded in 2006, then decreasing in subsequent years. 
Despite this trend, the H5N1 virus still represents a possible threat 
to human health, considering that more than half of human cases of 
H5N1 have been fatal. Moreover, despite the drop in the number of 
cases, the risk of a novel pandemic cannot be excluded, since H5N1 
continues to circulate in poultry in countries with elevated human 
population density and where monitoring systems are not fully 
appropriate. In addition, there is a major global concern about the 
potential occurrence of a reassortment between the 2009 pandemic 
H1N1 and the highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses following 
a co-infection in a susceptible host. Therefore, the implementation 
of appropriate surveillance and containment measures is crucial in 
order to minimize such risk.
In conclusion, H5N1 avian influenza is still a rare disease in humans 
but its clinical severe outcome requires a careful monitoring of the 
virus’s ability to evolve and to trigger a new pandemic. 
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outbreaks with high case lethality among domestic avian 
species (chickens, turkeys and quails) [10, 11].
The main difference in the pathogenicity between HPAI 
and LPAI viruses is determined by the cleavage site in 
the precursor of the hemagglutinin molecule. The he-
magglutinin is a glycoprotein that mediates the binding 
to the cellular receptor and promotes the release of the 
ribonucleoprotein-complex (viral RNA, polymerases 
and nucleoprotein) in the host cell. This glycoprotein is 
the primary mediator of pathogenicity, where the prote-
olytic cleavage site sequence determines whether infec-
tion will be systemic (highly pathogenic) or restricted to 
the respiratory and enteric tracts (low pathogenic). This 
difference is based on which type of proteases recogniz-
es the sequence that is present in the hemagglutinin mo-
lecule [10]. Indeed, the hemagglutinin of LPAI viruses 
has – at its cleavage site – a single amino acid arginine, 
which is usually recognized by proteases located in a 
limited number of host cells. For this reason, the LPAI 
viruses can cause only mild or moderate infections. Oth-
erwise, the hemagglutinin cleavage site of HPAI viruses 
is characterized by a sequence of basic amino acids; this 
multibasic sequence is recognized by proteases present 
in a wide range of host cells, which may favour systemic 
infections at high lethality in populations of domestic 
birds [10].
H5N1 virus
The ancestor of the HPAI H5N1 virus was isolated from 
infected geese in 1996 [13] in Guangdong, Southern 
China, the same region where SARS virus emerged in 
2003. The following year, the H5N1 virus was identi-
fied as the cause of disease in poultry in Hong Kong, 
and was promptly eliminated by culling infected ani-
mals [14]. From 1999 to 2002, the virus continued to cir-
culate both in waterfowl and in poultry markets in Hong 
Kong, causing several outbreaks in poultry flocks [15]. 
In 2004, H5N1 was isolated from crows in Japan [16] 
and, in 2005, from migratory waterfowls in Mongo-
lia [17]. Finally, – that year – the discovery of more 
than 6,000 dead migratory birds in Qinghai Lake was 
renowned [18, 19]. A major element in the determina-
tion of this new scenario was the expansion of the range 
of geographical spread of H5N1 virus across borders in 
Southeast Asia [20]. Between July and August 2005, 
outbreaks of avian influenza were reported in poultry 
flocks in Russia and Kazakhstan. In both these coun-
tries, outbreaks of H5N1 were ascribed to the contact 
between migratory and domestic birds through the shar-
ing of water sources [21]. In early August 2005, an out-
break in poultry was identified in Tibet and a plague of 
migratory birds was reported in Mongolia [17, 21]. Be-
tween February and May 2006, H5N1 virus reached 13 
countries: Iraq, Nigeria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Greece, 
Italy, Slovenia, Iran, Austria, Germany, Egypt, India and 
France [22]. The mute swans played an important role in 
the spread of the virus in the European countries such as 
to be considered as sentinel animals [6, 23]. Within the 
poultry flocks, the virus is transmitted very efficiently 
and infection can easily spread from farm to farm by 
the movement of infected live birds, people (especially 
when shoes and other clothing are contaminated) and 
contaminated vehicles, equipment, feed, and cages. All 
these aspects have to be taken into due consideration so 
as to implement suitable control measures within poultry 
farming. However, it is still difficult to control and pre-
vent the spread of this infection among poultry and the 
onset of recurrent outbreaks increases the risk for human 
exposure [24].
H5N1 infection in humans
In May 1997, the H5N1 virus was isolated in a throat 
swab collected from a 3-year-old child, who died from 
pulmonary complications due to an acute respiratory in-
fection, in Hong Kong [25]. In the same year, the H5N1 
virus caused 18 additional cases of severe respiratory 
disease, six of which were fatal [7, 26]. Human infec-
tions coincided with the onset of a widespread epidemic 
in poultry, supported by the same virus strain. Epide-
miological studies suggested that the virus was transmit-
ted directly from birds; in addition, the H5N1 viruses 
isolated from human biological samples did not show 
the characteristics of reassortant strains, but were simi-
lar to A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 strain (an AIV belong-
ing to the Eurasian lineage previously isolated from a 
goose died in the Guangdong province in China) [13]. 
In 2002, an antigenic drifted H5N1 strain – different 
from those previously circulating – emerged in Hong 
Kong, and came out to be highly pathogenic to several 
species of breeding birds. In early 2003, the H5N1 vi-
rus passed to humans again, infecting two members of 
a family (father and son) in Hong Kong [27]. Overall, 
from December 2003 to May 2011, a total of 553 cases 
and 323 deaths (58.4%) were reported in 15 countries in 
three continents (Africa, Asia, and Europe) (Fig. 1) [28]. 
Since the beginning of 2011, the surveillance of human 
cases of H5N1 allowed to record 37 cases and 17 deaths 
in Cambodia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Egypt. Up to 
now, human cases have occurred in rural or semi-urban 
areas and have always coincided with the onset of out-
breaks in poultry. Human infection is rare and requires 
the direct transmission of H5N1 virus to people in close 
contact with sick or dead poultry. Indeed, it has been 
demonstrated that humans have alpha-2-3-sialic-recep-
Fig. 1. Cumulative number of confirmed human cases and deaths 
of avian influenza a(h5n1) reported to world health organization 
(who) as to may 13, 2011 [28].
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tors specific for AIVs, and that these receptors are locat-
ed exclusively in the lower respiratory tract, particularly 
in the lungs [10, 29]. Thus, the AIVs can infect human 
cells only when present at high concentrations, as a re-
sult of a close contact with infected animals.
Wild waterfowls are the reservoir hosts of AIVs and are 
the population in which the best adaptation has occurred. 
The high degree of adaptation of AIVs in this natural 
reservoir is revealed by the absence of pathogenicity, 
that it is advantageous to the virus ecology [20]. From 
an epidemiological point of view, wild waterfowls are 
crucial since they allow the perpetuation of infection. 
The domestic birds act as “spill-over” hosts: they are 
susceptible to infection when exposed, eliminate the vi-
rus and transmit the infection to other hosts, but they are 
not able to maintain the infection for long periods. The 
“spill-over” hosts usually acquire a more severe disease 
than the reservoir hosts do. Humans are the “aberrant” 
hosts: they rarely become infected, but usually develop 
serious illness [7, 11].
The major route of transmission of H5N1 to human 
is represented by close contact with infected poultry. 
Sporadic cases have been described so far [30]. There 
is no evidence of human-to-human transmission to 
date. In poultry workers, despite the high potential for 
exposure, development of the disease has occurred on 
rare occasions. Nosocomial transmission in health care 
workers is possible but the probability of infection is 
very low compared to seasonal influenza, since H5N1 
infection is not transmitted efficiently from human-to-
human. Family clusters have been reported [30]; the 
explanation may be the result of a genetic suscepti-
bility, common behavioural habits or the presence of 
specific environmental factors.
Since the beginning of the epidemic, the average lethali-
ty rate was around 60%, ranging between 33% (Egypt) 
and 83% (Indonesia) [28]. This variability depends on 
several factors including early availability of medical 
care, clinical management of infected patients, biologi-
cal features of the infecting virus, surveillance bias, and 
characteristics of the population.
Is H5N1 a threat to human health?
Given the highly pathogenic impact for humans, the 
H5N1 virus poses a threat to public health worldwide. 
In addition, migratory birds can carry the virus to distant 
regions – as it happened in May 2005 –, and the virus 
can become capable of infecting other animal species, 
including cats, tigers and pigs, that could potentially act 
as mixing vessels [8, 9]. The greater the ability of H5N1 
to spread in different geographical contexts and in dif-
ferent animal hosts is, the greater the likelihood that the 
virus will experience antigenic variation mechanisms – 
enabling it to become pandemic – will be. At the time 
of writing, the H5N1 virus meets two of the three cri-
teria to become a virus capable of causing a pandemic 
in humans. These include the ability to infect human 
hosts and the susceptibility of human population to the 
infection. The ability to be transmitted efficiently from 
an infected person to a susceptible one (the third crite-
rion) has been excluded so far. However, the H5N1 virus 
might acquire – through genetic adaptive mechanisms – 
the ability to efficiently trigger the chain of inter-human 
contagion. At present, this hypothesis is considered pos-
sible, though not predictable.
While H5N1 virus has not yet acquired a pandemic 
status, a novel swine-origin influenza A virus of H1N1 
subtype emerged and caused a pandemic in 2009. This 
H1N1 virus contains a unique combination of gene 
segments from swine, avian, and human viruses, and 
was first identified in humans in April 2009 [31]. 
Spontaneous reassortment of H5N1 virus with human 
influenza viruses has not been reported; however, the 
emergence and the establishment of this novel H1N1 
virus in the human population may represent a new 
opportunity for such reassortment to happen with the 
creation of new potentially pandemic viruses [32].
The acquisition of transmissibility of H5N1 in human 
populations can involve two main mechanisms: a) ge-
netic reassortment, and b) adaptive mutations. The 
mechanism of reassortment could lead to the emergence 
of a fully transmissible pandemic virus, announced by 
a sudden and unexpected increase in the number of in-
fected cases as well as an explosive spread of the virus. 
The second mechanism can involve a gradual process of 
acquisition of mutations in the viral genome that could 
enable the virus to efficiently bind specific receptors 
present on human cells. In such occurrence, small clus-
ters of human cases with evidence of human-to-human 
transmission would announce the pandemic. In this sce-
nario, there will be more options for action with appro-
priate public health countermeasures.
Hence, which are the viral features of public health inter-
est that must be constantly monitored? Above all, the re-
ceptor-binding sites in the hemagglutinin molecule. If the 
virus mutates in these sites – thus acquiring the ability to 
bind alpha-2-6-sialic receptors –, it will become efficient-
ly transmissible to humans [10]. Another important aspect 
is related to the viral polymerase complex. For example, 
H5N1 strains presenting the amino acid mutation E627K 
in their PB2 gene have been shown to be associated with 
a higher efficiency of replication in mammals [33, 34]. 
Other viral factors that should be taken into account are: 
the hemagglutinin-cleavage sites, determining the suscep-
tibility to ubiquitous proteases and, thus, bringing about 
systemic infections, and the NS1, PB2 and PB1 genes, all 
involved in the induction of cytokine cascade – triggering 
the so called “cytokine storm” [35-38].
Concluding remarks
At the time of writing, the H5N1 influenza remains a 
disease of birds with a significant species barrier: in the 
presence of some tens million cases of infection in poul-
try – with a wide geographical spread –, only just over 
hundreds cases have occurred in humans. To date, hu-
man cases have been reported in 15 countries, mainly in 
Asia. Indonesia, Egypt and Vietnam have been the most 
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hit countries. So far, all the recorded human cases were 
related to the onset of outbreaks in poultry.
The cumulative number of H5N1 cases in humans since 
the beginning of 2003 to May 2011 is 553, with a total of 
323 (58.4%) deaths [28]. A peak was recorded in 2006 
and a decreasing trend was then observed in subsequent 
years (Fig. 1). Despite this trend, the H5N1 virus still 
represents a possible threat to human health, consider-
ing that more than half of human cases of H5N1 have 
been fatal. Moreover, despite the drop in the number of 
cases, the risk of a novel pandemic cannot be excluded, 
since H5N1 continues to circulate in poultry in coun-
tries with elevated human population density and where 
monitoring systems are not fully appropriate. There is a 
major global concern about the potential occurrence of a 
reassortment between the 2009 pandemic H1N1 and the 
highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses following a 
co-infection in a susceptible host. Therefore, the imple-
mentation of appropriate surveillance and containment 
measures is crucial in order to minimize such risk.
In conclusion, H5N1 avian influenza is still a rare dis-
ease in humans but its clinical severe outcome requires a 
careful monitoring of the virus’s ability to evolve and to 
trigger a new pandemic.
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